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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
would make the transaction a fraud upon the purchaser if it were
not enforced," as set forth in the Bridgewater opinion.




A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas' involved
the question whether or not a tax lien held by the city against
certain property was merged in the title obtained by the city to
that property upon foreclosure of its tax lien where the city sub-
sequently reconveyed the property to the former owner in ex-
change for a partial cash payment and notes secured by a deed
of trust for the balance. An ancillary question considered by the
court was whether a private person who acquired the notes and
deed of trust from the city could claim the right of the city to
be free from the statute of limitations in respect to such tax lien.
A divided court decided that the tax lien survived the foreclosure
proceedings and that the purchaser of the deed of trust given by
the owner to secure the balance due was entitled to be subro-
gated to the city's right to be free from the bar of the statute of
limitations.
Under the facts of the case the city, through its improvement
district, foreclosed a tax lien for delinquent taxes on certain prop-
erty and received a commissioner's deed to the property. Shortly
thereafter, the city agreed to and actually did deed the property
back to the original owner in exchange for a substantial cash
payment and his notes, secured by a deed of trust on the prop-
erty, for the balance.
The plaintiff in this suit bought the notes from the city and
1 Lueken v. Burch, 214 Ark. 921, 219 S. W. 2d 235 (1949).
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took an assignment of the deed of trust securing the same. The
notes being unpaid, plaintiff brought suit to establish a lien against
the property and for foreclosure. Before the suit was filed, the
five-year Arkansas statute of limitations had run on the notes
and, consequently, on the deed of trust. This fact was pleaded
as a defense at the trial, but the issue was decided in favor of
the plaintiff for the reasons enumerated below.
First, the court decided that the original tax lien had never
been discharged, despite the fact that the lien had been foreclosed
by the city improvement district and title obtained by the district,
and that the lien remained in force against the land. Second, the
court decided that the plaintiff was entitled to be subrogated to
the right of the improvement district to foreclose its original tax
lien against the land, and since the lien of the improvement dis-
trict was not avoided by the passage of time, the plaintiff was
entitled to like immunity from the statute of limitations.
The dissenting judges contended that there was a merger of the
tax lien and the title obtained at the foreclosure sale at the time
the city took the deed to the land following the foreclosure pro-
ceedings. Generally, in the Southwestern States, this is the case,2
but involved here was an Arkansas tax statute3 which previously
had been construed to the contrary. Under this statute it had been
held that a tax lien could not be discharged until full payment
of the taxes due was made, regardless of where the title to the
land might rest."
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
The Texas court in Cecil v. Dollar5 held that the defendant, who
had bought in a title, complete as to surface and mineral interests,
through foreclosure of an outstanding incumbrance at a trustee's
sale, which incumbrance he had expressly agreed to assume, could
2158 A.L.R. 563, 565 (1945).
8 ARK. STAT. 1941 ArN. § 20-414.
4 Spikes v. Beloate, 206 Ark. 344, 175 S. W. 2d. 579 (1943).
147 Tex. 551, 218 S. W. 2d. 448 (1949).
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not assert the title so gained against his grantor of the land, who
had reserved a one-half mineral interest.
The plaintiff had borrowed money and given notes in exchange,
secured by a deed of trust on the land involved in this suit. Sub-
sequently, plaintiff conveyed the surface estate and one-half of the
mineral estate in this land to the defendant, who contracted to as-
sume the indebtedness which was covered by the deed of trust.
The defendant, although able to pay, defaulted in his payments
to the holder of the deed of trust, and the trustee was instructed
to sell the land. At the trustee's sale defendant bought in the title,
which covered not only the portion of the land and mineral estate
conveyed to the defendant but also the one-half mineral interest
which the grantor had reserved.
In holding that defendant could not assert the title so acquired
against his grantor, the court stated that the purchase of the out-
standing incumbrance by the defendant, who was called a cotenant,
must inure to the benefit of all the cotenants, and that the pur-
chasing cotenant could acquire no title to the interest of a fellow
cotenant by such transaction. The court pointed out that it would
be inequitable to allow this defendant to profit by his wrong, and
declared the defendant to be a constructive trustee of the one-half
mineral interest for the benefit of the plaintiff. The principles of
law which formed the basis of the court's opinion have been
enunciated previously by the Texas courts.
MECHANIC'S LIENS
The New Mexico court held that where construction work ap-
peared to an owner-vendor of real estate to be a single act per-
formed by one contractor, notice of non-liability under the New
Mexico non-responsibility statute7 would avoid liability for un-
paid construction costs and liens after the vendor had legally
6 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Bryson, -Tex.-, 219 S. W. 2d. 799
(1949) ; Roberts v. Thorn, 25 Tex. 728 (1860) ; see 14 Am. Juris. Cotenancy, sec. 51;
46 A.L.R. 322, 336 (1927) ; 54 A.L.R. 874, 884 (1928).
IN. M. STAT. (1941) ANN. § 63-210.
[Vol. 4
1.950] SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1949 343
rescinded the contract of sale, although two contractors had been
employed by the vendee to make separate improvements to the
land.!
The vendee, having contracted to buy a parcel of land from
the plaintiff, entered into two contracts for the building of addi-
tions to existing buildings. The vendee employed independent con-
tractors to do the construction work, and one contractor com-
menced performance under his contract. The plaintiff promptly
posted notice of non-liability in compliance with the statute. Two
weeks later the second contractor commenced performance under
his contract. He contended that the notice of non-liability was in-
effectual as to him. Plaintiff did not have actual notice that the
two jobs were being done by distinct contractors.
The court said that as long as the notice was posted properly
under the statute and remained posted a reasonable time, and
as long as the plaintiff was in good faith in his belief that only
one contractor was involved, the court must absolve the plaintiff's
land of liability as to both contractors, as directed by the statute.
The New Mexico statute enables a vendor of land to avoid the
effect of mechanic's liens filed for unpaid costs of improvements
when the vendee who has contracted for the improvements de-
faults and the vendor rescinds the contract and regains title and
possession of the land. There is no similar statute for non-liability
in effect in the other Southwestern States. The states from which
New Mexico took its statute recognize the rule laid down in the
principal case.9
Paul Thorp.
s Petrakis v. Krasnow, 54 N. M. 39, 213 P. 2d. 220 (1949).
0 123 A.LR. 7. 40 (1939); 36 Am. Juris., Mechanic's Liens, sec. 120.
